Saturday, January 31, 2004

It is all in the motives

Well I would like to bring up this article, and point out the fact the world actually listened to these groups.

The Companies of the Russian Communist Party: 137 million
The Companies of the Liberal Democratic Party: 79.8 million
The Russian Committee for Solidarity with Iraq: 6.5 million and 12.5 million (2 separate contracts)
Head of the Russian Presidential Cabinet: 90 million
The Russian Orthodox Church: 5 million

Charles Pasqua, former minister of interior: 12 million
Trafigura (Patrick Maugein), businessman: 25 million
Ibex: 47.2 million
Bernard Merimee, former French ambassador to the United Nations: 3 million
Michel Grimard, founder of the French-Iraqi Export Club: 17.1 million

Firas Mostafa Tlass, son of Syria's defense minister: 6 million

Zeynel Abidin Erdem: more than 27 million
Lotfy Doghan: more than 11 million

Megawati Sukarnoputri: 11 million

Ali Ballout, Lebanese journalist: 8.8 million

The Socialist Party: 22 million
Kostunica's Party: 6 million

Arthur Millholland, president and CEO of Oilexco: 9.5 million

Father Benjamin, a French Catholic priest who arranged a meeting between the pope and Tariq Aziz: 4.5 million
Roberto Frimigoni: 24.5 million

United States
Samir Vincent: 7 million
Shakir Alkhalaji: 10.5 million

United Kingdom
George Galloway, member of Parliament: 19 million
Mujaheddin Khalq: 36.5 million

South Africa
Tokyo Saxwale: 4 million

Shaker bin Zaid: 6.5 million
The Jordanian Ministry of Energy: 5 million
Fawaz Zureikat: 6 million
Toujan Al Faisal, former member of Parliament: 3 million

The son of President Lahoud: 5.5 million

Khaled Abdel Nasser: 16.5 million
Emad Al Galda, businessman and Parliament member: 14 million

Palestinian Territories
The Palestinian Liberation Organization: 4 million
Abu Al Abbas: 11.5 million

Hamad bin Ali Al Thany: 14 million

Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem: 1 million

Foreign minister of Chad: 3 million

The October 8th Movement: 4.5 million

Myanmar (Burma)
The minister of the Forests of Myanmar: 5 million

The Social Democratic Party: 8.5 million
The Communist Party: 6 million
The Socialist Party: 2 million
The FTD oil company: 2 million

Does it strike you as odd that the two biggest international detractors of the war, also had the most to loss from Iraq's fall. They were allowing the continued rule of a dictator that took hundreds if not hundreds of thousands of lives, just so they could get cheap oil.

I wonder if this is even getting big press over in Europe.


Friday, January 30, 2004

Sign me up

I officially announce a competition for who can pay me the most to serve your prison sentence. I will accept no bids where the sentence is shorter than a year or longer than 5 years. My decision will be based on who pays me the most per month - after travel is deducted. Additional amenities will be factored into my decision (ie 401ks, health insurance, and life insurance).

leave a comment on this post, and I will contact you.

It was brought on by this article.


Not for kids

More real blood than i have ever seen. I wonder what PETA thinks about this.


Dean is starting to look a little gay

Dean is a moron and he is taking incorrect, widely-publicized views and stating them as a fact. Secondly he (and his church) is lying/ignoring/disqualifying about what the bible says.

Dean says:

"The overwhelming evidence is that there is very significant, substantial genetic component to it," Dean said in an interview Wednesday. "From a religious point of view, if God had thought homosexuality is a sin, he would not have created gay people."

This is an interesting website which shoots holes as big as dean's in his statement.

On the side bar you will find links to some very good information.

If you spend enough time on the website you might find this link.

I would like to bring up the point that the entire human genome is mapped, which means that we know more about the genetic makeup of humans than we ever have. Additionally, the fact the above website exists means the case is still out on the "gay gene". If anything, our extensive knowledge of the human genome has shown simple switches do not exist in every case. In some cases, the genes only predispose someone towards certain behavior, such as a "fat gene". There are plenty of skinny people who have fat genes, but they are not fat because of their environment or choices they make. These feeble attempts to blame people's behavior on conditions out of people's control are truly sickening.

Secondly, I normally don't bring the Bible up, unless some one does first. I do not see how the church dean is apart of can say homosexuality is not a sin (from a Biblical perspective). The only way to do that is to take parts of the Bible and fit them together to form a view you want to see. In other words manipulate it to mean what you want it to me (consciously or unconsciously). Do you really want someone who engages in spiritual self deception to lead your country?

A direct quote for the bible itself:

Do you not know that the wicked will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor male prostitutes nor homosexual offenders nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God.

Only thing I can say positive about dean is that he is liberal on all counts (and that is consistent).


Thursday, January 29, 2004

In other news

I have brought you this story, once before. But for a different take.,,5-2004040384,00.html

What do you think about that?


Iraq and al-Qaida

Here is all the evidence I could find that link al-Qaida and Iraq.

Iran spies were not believed which may be a good thing.

al-Qaida and Iran

Iraq-Cuba connection


Iran's attempts to watch their selves.,2933,109349,00.html

All of that was to show that al-Qaida and other countries have ties to each other, and that there are many things that we don't know, and given the nature of the organizations that we are dealing with, we can also assume a lot.

Now the good stuff.

I don't know how creditable this site is, but here it is anyways.

A interesting site

A well researched article

More good stuff

Ok do you or do you not believe that Iraq and al-Qaida were linked?

Given the Kay report do you belief that Saddam Hussein was harmless?

Well I think they only way you can answer that question is the same way Powell did.

QUESTION: On the subject of weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Secretary, one of
the other conclusions of that report was that there was no evidence of a
connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida and that there was no evidence
of a likelihood that he would transfer weapons to al-Qaida.

What do you think about that, looking back? And I know that, you know,
hindsight is 20/20, but to think back --


QUESTION: Do you think that there were ways other than war to have handled this
threat and that the -- that it was not an imminent threat to the United States?

SECRETARY POWELL: My presentation on the 5th of February when I talked to this
issue made it clear that we had seen some links and connections to terrorist
organizations over time, and I focused on one particular case, Zawahiri, and I
think that was a pretty solid case.

There is not -- you know, I have not seen smoking-gun, concrete evidence about
the connection, but I think the possibility of such connections did exist and
it was prudent to consider them at the time that we did.

Now that you have Powells remarks and all the above information read this.


Tuesday, January 27, 2004

What the crap

Well the crazy Syrians did it again?,1,2983903.story?coll=la-headlines-world

"This [assertion] is meant to mislead" the public, Information Minister Ahmed Hassan told reporters in Damascus, the Syrian capital. "So long as there were no weapons of mass destruction [found] in Iraq itself, how can they be in Syria?"

The Americans, he said, "are seeking to cover their failure

What does this guy mean? I guess it could be a mistranslation, but oh well.


Sunday, January 25, 2004

What does poor mean?

In this article there was a study that said the average poor person in America is better off than the average person in Europe.,2933,109386,00.html

I am not going to get into the discussion about whether or not the study is correct, it was a fairly short article with a small amount of numbers.

But I do want to discuss this statement.

I just think that measuring quality of life in the United States -- or for that matter anywhere -- by material possessions is morally bankrupt," said Bob Erlenbusch with the Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger (search). "We've got in L.A. County on any given night, 80,000 to 90,000 people who are homeless."

Well what other measure would you propose for the quality of life. We could measure disease rate, education, access to health care, basic access to sanitation services. The list could go on, but all of these are affected by one thing: wealth. The more money you have the better access to services you will have.

This guy is a moron. I hope he dies when he trespasses on my land.

What is the human development index (HDI)?
The HDI; human development index; is a summary composite index that measures a country's average achievements in three basic aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio; and standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP US$).

Hmm it seems like money is important. It also seems like money affects the other two statistics greatly also.


I swear...

By the time that I am thirty I am going to be a crazy old man who carries a gun around in the country and shoots anything that moves.

"Be careful sheriff you had better call his cell phone first to tell him you are coming, or he will shoot you."

But this recent article on fox news has be pissed.,2933,109377,00.html

Basically what's happening in the city of St. Louis, and I know in cities all over the country, is that our infrastructure, our transportation infrastructure is crumbling, our schools are short of money. Our school system is experiencing a $73 million budget shortfall," Slay said. "The state fiscal issues are trickling down to the city level ... and it is a bad situation."

Let me go down the list.
Infrastructure: Hmm that sounds like the states assets (electrical grid, telephone network, state run utilities)
Transportation infrastructure: this is sounds like the state and city roads (although he could be talking about some federal interstates)
Schools: State, county, and city. Once again (Maybe if his schools would buck up and take the federal money and start meeting federal goals he would not have that problem)
Fiscal Issues: He says it is the states once again.

It sounds like this guy want the president to personally fix all of his problems. This guy would be on welfare if it he did not hold and office of mayor. He lists all of the problems he has and it seems most of them are the sates problems and not the federal governments problems. Maybe if he took no pay like TN's governor, that would help out his city a little bit.

I wonder if he gets paid more than the governor of Missouri. (like Memphis's mayor does)


Libya Scandal

I had hoped this was not the case, but it seems more and more apparent that Libya is getting something absolutely huge out of this deal.

This article details Libya's actions.

Given their openness, they are either playing a deadly game of trying to get the world off of their back so that in 10 to 15 years they will have the cash and technology to build whatever bomb they want, or several other unlikely back-door deals that we are doing with them. Although they are giving up a lot, I don't see what they are getting out of this yet. Well I hope that when the scandal breaks it happens after the 2004 election for Bush's sake.

Of course, we are bring down a lot of dirty individuals.


Saturday, January 24, 2004

Moooneeey..Its a gas

Well I was doing some reading at CNN.

And I picked this up.

To cite a severe example, if you had bought the stocks in the Dow Jones industrial average at their peak in early 1966, you wouldn't have made any significant profit until mid-1983 -- more than 17 years later. Even that was better than if you'd bought in the pre-crash peak of 1929. After that, it took until 1954 for the market to regain all it lost in the Depression. As for the market woes of the early 2000s, it would take more than five years using an historical average rate of return, for the Dow to return to its glory-day levels from its October 2002 low.

Well I looked up some data, and apparently from that October low in 2002 we have regained half of what we lost, in just a year and a half.

As of when I wrote this article the Dow had closed at 10568.29. Which is a good bit more than the earlier graph stated.

Very interesting huh.


Friday, January 23, 2004

Here is the Kay report in full

I normally just provide links, but links get broken and servers get moved. Enjoy


October 2, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to discuss with the Committee the progress that the Iraq Survey Group has made in its initial three months of its investigation into Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that the Interim Progress Report, which has been made available to you, is a snapshot, in the context of an on-going investigation, of where we are after our first three months of work. The report does not represent a final reckoning of Iraq's WMD programs, nor are we at the point where we are prepared to close the file on any of these programs. While solid progress - I would say even remarkable progress considering the conditions that the ISG has had to work under - has been made in this initial period of operations, much remains to be done. We are still very much in the collection and analysis mode, still seeking the information and evidence that will allow us to confidently draw comprehensive conclusions to the actual objectives, scope, and dimensions of Iraq's WMD activities at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraq's WMD programs spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The very scale of this program when coupled with the conditions in Iraq that have prevailed since the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom dictate the speed at which we can move to a comprehensive understanding of Iraq's WMD activities.

We need to recall that in the 1991-2003 period the intelligence community and the UN/IAEA inspectors had to draw conclusions as to the status of Iraq's WMD program in the face of incomplete, and often false, data supplied by Iraq or data collected either by UN/IAEA inspectors operating within the severe constraints that Iraqi security and deception actions imposed or by national intelligence collection systems with their own inherent limitations. The result was that our understanding of the status of Iraq's WMD program was always bounded by large uncertainties and had to be heavily caveated. With the regime of Saddam Hussein at an end, ISG has the opportunity for the first time of drawing together all the evidence that can still be found in Iraq - much evidence is irretrievably lost - to reach definitive conclusions concerning the true state of Iraq's WMD program. It is far too early to reach any definitive conclusions and, in some areas, we may never reach that goal. The unique nature of this opportunity, however, requires that we take great care to ensure that the conclusions we draw reflect the truth to the maximum extent possible given the conditions in post-conflict Iraq.

We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis.

Why are we having such difficulty in finding weapons or in reaching a confident conclusion that they do not exist or that they once existed but have been removed? Our search efforts are being hindered by six principal factors:

From birth all of Iraq's WMD activities were highly compartmentalized within a regime that ruled and kept its secrets through fear and terror and with deception and denial built into each program;

Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation related to weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans-to-post conflict;

Post-OIF looting destroyed or dispersed important and easily collectable material and forensic evidence concerning Iraq's WMD program. As the report covers in detail, significant elements of this looting were carried out in a systematic and deliberate manner, with the clear aim of concealing pre-OIF activities of Saddam's regime;

Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pre/trans conflict period and may have taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with them;

Any actual WMD weapons or material is likely to be small in relation to the total conventional armaments footprint and difficult to near impossible to identify with normal search procedures. It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching for, in the quantities we would expect to find, can be concealed in spaces not much larger than a two car garage;

The environment in Iraq remains far from permissive for our activities, with many Iraqis that we talk to reporting threats and overt acts of intimidation and our own personnel being the subject of threats and attacks. In September alone we have had three attacks on ISG facilities or teams: The ISG base in Irbil was bombed and four staff injured, two very seriously; a two person team had their vehicle blocked by gunmen and only escaped by firing back through their own windshield; and on Wednesday, 24 September, the ISG Headquarters in Baghdad again was subject to mortar attack.
Supporting Images

Click Image to Enlarge
Vials: A total of 97 vials-including those with labels consistent with the al Hakam cover stories of single-cell protein and biopesticides, as well as strains that could be used to produce BW agents-were recovered from a scientist's residence.

Click Image to Enlarge
Lab Equipment From Mosque.

Click Image to Enlarge
Burned Documents Found at SAAD Center: An exploitation team on a recent mission to the SAAD Center, part of the Baghdad New Nuclear Design Center, found massive looting and the remnants of deliberately destroyed documents. Other documents were left untouched, however, and recovered by the team

Click Image to Enlarge
Storage room in basement of Revolutionary Command Council Headquarters. Burned frames of PC workstations visible on shelves. All rooms sharing walls with this storage room were untouched from fire or battle damage.

Click Image to Enlarge
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The basement historical files were systematically selected and destroyed.

What have we found and what have we not found in the first 3 months of our work?

We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN. Let me just give you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will elaborate on later:

A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.

A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.

Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.

New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.

Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).

A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.

Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.

Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.

Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles --probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment.
In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment efforts, we have been faced with a systematic sanitization of documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts to erase evidence - hard drives destroyed, specific files burned, equipment cleaned of all traces of use - are ones of deliberate, rather than random, acts. For example,

On 10 July 2003 an ISG team exploited the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Headquarters in Baghdad. The basement of the main building contained an archive of documents situated on well-organized rows of metal shelving. The basement suffered no fire damage despite the total destruction of the upper floors from coalition air strikes. Upon arrival the exploitation team encountered small piles of ash where individual documents or binders of documents were intentionally destroyed. Computer hard drives had been deliberately destroyed. Computers would have had financial value to a random looter; their destruction, rather than removal for resale or reuse, indicates a targeted effort to prevent Coalition forces from gaining access to their contents.

All IIS laboratories visited by IIS exploitation teams have been clearly sanitized, including removal of much equipment, shredding and burning of documents, and even the removal of nameplates from office doors.

Although much of the deliberate destruction and sanitization of documents and records probably occurred during the height of OIF combat operations, indications of significant continuing destruction efforts have been found after the end of major combat operations, including entry in May 2003 of the locked gated vaults of the Ba'ath party intelligence building in Baghdad and highly selective destruction of computer hard drives and data storage equipment along with the burning of a small number of specific binders that appear to have contained financial and intelligence records, and in July 2003 a site exploitation team at the Abu Ghurayb Prison found one pile of the smoldering ashes from documents that was still warm to the touch.
I would now like to review our efforts in each of the major lines of enquiry that ISG has pursued during this initial phase of its work.

With regard to biological warfare activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents.

Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production. The IIS also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists and IIS sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-applicable research. This was the only area of graduate work that the IIS appeared to sponsor.

Discussions with Iraqi scientists uncovered agent R&D work that paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents. Examples include: B. Thurengiensis (Bt) with B. anthracis (anthrax), and medicinal plants with ricin. In a similar vein, two key former BW scientists, confirmed that Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists discussed the development of improved, simplified fermentation and spray drying capabilities for the simulant Bt that would have been directly applicable to anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production line for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.

A very large body of information has been developed through debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi documents that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced. This discovery - hidden in the home of a BW scientist - illustrates the point I made earlier about the difficulty of locating small stocks of material that can be used to covertly surge production of deadly weapons. The scientist who concealed the vials containing this agent has identified a large cache of agents that he was asked, but refused, to conceal. ISG is actively searching for this second cache.

Additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substances, but progress in this area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.

We have not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a mobile BW production effort. Investigation into the origin of and intended use for the two trailers found in northern Iraq in April has yielded a number of explanations, including hydrogen, missile propellant, and BW production, but technical limitations would prevent any of these processes from being ideally suited to these trailers. That said, nothing we have discovered rules out their potential use in BW production.

We have made significant progress in identifying and locating individuals who were reportedly involved in a mobile program, and we are confident that we will be able to get an answer to the questions as to whether there was a mobile program and whether the trailers that have been discovered so far were part of such a program.

Let me turn now to chemical weapons (CW). In searching for retained stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend with the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional weapons armory, which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the physical size of any conceivable stock of chemical weapons. For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 square miles in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately 120 still remain unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort is enormous.

While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as late as 2003. When Saddam had asked a senior military official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to produce new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that after he consulted with CW experts in OMI he responded it would take six months for mustard. Another senior Iraqi chemical weapons expert in responding to a request in mid-2002 from Uday Husayn for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam estimated that it would take two months to produce mustard and two years for Sarin.

We are starting to survey parts of Iraq's chemical industry to determine if suitable equipment and bulk chemicals were available for chemical weapons production. We have been struck that two senior Iraqi officials volunteered that if they had been ordered to resume CW production Iraq would have been willing to use stainless steel systems that would be disposed of after a few production runs, in place of corrosive-resistant equipment which they did not have.

We continue to follow leads on Iraq's acquisition of equipment and bulk precursors suitable for a CW program. Several possibilities have emerged and are now being exploited. One example involves a foreign company with offices in Baghdad, that imported in the past into Iraq dual-use equipment and maintained active contracts through 2002. Its Baghdad office was found looted in August 2003, but we are pursuing other locations and associates of the company.

Information obtained since OIF has identified several key areas in which Iraq may have engaged in proscribed or undeclared activity since 1991, including research on a possible VX stabilizer, research and development for CW-capable munitions, and procurement/concealment of dual-use materials and equipment.

Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program after 1991. Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced - if not entirely destroyed - during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections. We are carefully examining dual-use, commercial chemical facilities to determine whether these were used or planned as alternative production sites.

We have also acquired information related to Iraq's CW doctrine and Iraq's war plans for OIF, but we have not yet found evidence to confirm pre-war reporting that Iraqi military units were prepared to use CW against Coalition forces. Our efforts to collect and exploit intelligence on Iraq's chemical weapons program have thus far yielded little reliable information on post-1991 CW stocks and CW agent production, although we continue to receive and follow leads related to such stocks. We have multiple reports that Iraq retained CW munitions made prior to 1991, possibly including mustard - a long-lasting chemical agent - but we have to date been unable to locate any such munitions.

With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future point. Some indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of sanctions. At least one senior Iraqi official believed that by 2000 Saddam had run out of patience with waiting for sanctions to end and wanted to restart the nuclear program. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around 1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and increased its overall funding levels. This expansion may have been in initial preparation for renewed nuclear weapons research, although documentary evidence of this has not been found, and this is the subject of continuing investigation by ISG.

Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to nuclear weapons development. These initiatives did not in-and-of themselves constitute a resumption of the nuclear weapons program, but could have been useful in developing a weapons-relevant science base for the long-term. We do not yet have information indicating whether a higher government authority directed Sa'id to initiate this research and, regretfully, Dr. Said was killed on April 8th during the fall of Baghdad when the car he was riding in attempted to run a Coalition roadblock.

Despite evidence of Saddam's continued ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material. However, Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.

According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). Some scientists from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program have told ISG that they believed that these working groups were preserved in order to allow a reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, but none of the scientists could produce official orders or plans to support their belief.

In some cases, these groups performed work which could help preserve the science base and core skills that would be needed for any future fissile material production or nuclear weapons development.

Several scientists - at the direction of senior Iraqi government officials - preserved documents and equipment from their pre-1991 nuclear weapon-related research and did not reveal this to the UN/IAEA. One Iraqi scientist recently stated in an interview with ISG that it was a "common understanding" among the scientists that material was being preserved for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related work.
The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program. Most of this activity centered on activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused some of his former colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect that Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the centrifuge program. We do not yet fully understand Iraqi intentions, and the evidence does not tie any activity directly to centrifuge research or development.

Exploitation of additional documents may shed light on the projects and program plans of Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id. There may be more projects to be discovered in research placed at universities and private companies. Iraqi interest in reconstitution of a uranium enrichment program needs to be better understood through the analysis of procurement records and additional interviews.

With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km and that measures to conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were initiated in late-2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors. Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid propellant missile, and it appears the work had progressed to a point to support initial prototype production of some parts and assemblies. According to a cooperating senior detainee, Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid-propellant and solid-propellant missile design centers would take too long. For instance, the liquid-propellant missile project team forecast first delivery in six years. Saddam countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile designed and built inside of six months. On the other hand several sources contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles grew from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002.

ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN. ISG is presently seeking additional confirmation and details on this project. A second cooperative source has stated that the program actually began in 2001, but that it received added impetus in the run-up to OIF, and that missiles from this project were transferred to a facility north of Baghdad. This source also provided documentary evidence of instructions to convert SA-2s into surface-to-surface missiles.

ISG has obtained testimony from both detainees and cooperative sources that indicate that proscribed-range solid-propellant missile design studies were initiated, or already underway, at the time when work on the clustered liquid-propellant missile designs began. The motor diameter was to be 800 to 1000mm, i.e. much greater than the 500-mm Ababil-100. The range goals cited for this system vary from over 400km up to 1000km, depending on the source and the payload mass.

A cooperative source, involved in the 2001-2002 deliberations on the long-range solid propellant project, provided ISG with a set of concept designs for a launcher designed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length missile. The limited detail in the drawings suggest there was some way to go before launcher fabrication. The source believes that these drawings would not have been requested until the missile progress was relatively advanced, normally beyond the design state. The drawing are in CAD format, with files dated 09/01/02.

While we have obtained enough information to make us confident that this design effort was underway, we are not yet confident which accounts of the timeline and project progress are accurate and are now seeking to better understand this program and its actual progress at the time of OIF.

One cooperative source has said that he suspected that the new large-diameter solid-propellant missile was intended to have a CW-filled warhead, but no detainee has admitted any actual knowledge of plans for unconventional warheads for any current or planned ballistic missile. The suspicion expressed by the one source about a CW warhead was based on his assessment of the unavailability of nuclear warheads and potential survivability problems of biological warfare agent in ballistic missile warheads. This is an area of great interest and we are seeking additional information on warhead designs.

While I have spoken so far of planned missile systems, one high-level detainee has recently claimed that Iraq retained a small quantity of Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001, although he subsequently recanted these claims, work continues to determine the truth. Two other sources contend that Iraq continued to produce until 2001 liquid fuel and oxidizer specific to Scud-type systems. The cooperating source claims that the al Tariq Factory was used to manufacture Scud oxidizer (IRFNA) from 1996 to 2001, and that nitrogen tetroxide, a chief ingredient of IRFNA was collected from a bleed port on the production equipment, was reserved, and then mixed with highly concentrated nitric acid plus an inhibitor to produce Scud oxidizer. Iraq never declared its pre-Gulf War capability to manufacture Scud IRFNA out of fear, multiple sources have stated, that the al Tariq Factory would be destroyed, leaving Baghdad without the ability to produce highly concentrated nitric acid, explosives and munitions. To date we have not discovered documentary or material evidence to corroborate these claims, but continued efforts are underway to clarify and confirm this information with additional Iraqi sources and to locate corroborating physical evidence. If we can confirm that the fuel was produced as late as 2001, and given that Scud fuel can only be used in Scud-variant missiles, we will have strong evidence that the missiles must have been retained until that date. This would, of course, be yet another example of a failure to declare prohibited activities to the UN.

Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms and maintained two UAV programs that were working in parallel, one at Ibn Fernas and one at al-Rashid Air Force Base. Ibn Fernas worked on the development of smaller, more traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion of manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to the UN until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the RPV-20, RPV-30 and Pigeon RPV systems to the UN. All these systems had declared ranges of less than 150km. Several Iraqi officials stated that the RPV-20 flew over 500km on autopilot in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the system's range. The al-Rashid group was developing a competing line of UAVs. This program was never fully declared to the UN and is the subject of on-going work by ISG. Additional work is also focusing on the payloads and intended use for these UAVs. Surveillance and use as decoys are uses mentioned by some of those interviewed. Given Iraq's interest before the Gulf War in attempting to convert a MIG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents, attention is being paid to whether any of the newer generation of UAVs were intended to have a similar purpose. This remains an open question.

ISG has discovered evidence of two primary cruise missile programs. The first appears to have been successfully implemented, whereas the second had not yet reached maturity at the time of OIF.

The first involved upgrades to the HY-2 coastal-defense cruise missile. ISG has developed multiple sources of testimony, which is corroborated in part by a captured document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its original 100km to 150-180km. Ten modified missiles were delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were fired from Umm Qasr during OIF - one was shot down and one hit Kuwait.

The second program, called the Jenin, was a much more ambitious effort to convert the HY-2 into a 1000km range land-attack cruise missile. The Jenin concept was presented to Saddam on 23 November 2001 and received what cooperative sources called an "unusually quick response" in little more than a week. The essence of the concept was to take an HY-2, strip it of its liquid rocket engine, and put in its place a turbine engine from a Russian helicopter - the TV-2-117 or TV3-117 from a Mi-8 or Mi-17helicopter. To prevent discovery by the UN, Iraq halted engine development and testing and disassembled the test stand in late 2002 before the design criteria had been met.

In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's attempts to develop delivery systems beyond the permitted UN 150km, ISG has also developed information on Iraqi attempts to purchase proscribed missiles and missile technology. Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included an October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300km (probably No Dong) and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300km. The document quotes the North Koreans as understanding the limitations imposed by the UN, but being prepared "to cooperate with Iraq on the items it specified". At the time of OIF, these discussions had not led to any missiles being transferred to Iraq. A high level cooperating source has reported that in late 2002 at Saddam's behest a delegation of Iraqi officials was sent to meet with foreign export companies, including one that dealt with missiles. Iraq was interested in buying an advanced ballistic missile with 270km and 500km ranges.

The ISG has also identified a large volume of material and testimony by cooperating Iraq officials on Iraq's effort to illicitly procure parts and foreign assistance for its missile program. These include:

Significant level of assistance from a foreign company and its network of affiliates in supplying and supporting the development of production capabilities for solid rocket propellant and dual-use chemicals.

Entities from another foreign country were involved in supplying guidance and control systems for use in the Al-Fat'h (Ababil-100). The contract was incomplete by the time of OIF due to technical problems with the few systems delivered and a financial dispute.

A group of foreign experts operating in a private capacity were helping to develop Iraq's liquid propellant ballistic missile RDT&E and production infrastructure. They worked in Baghdad for about three months in late 1998 and subsequently continued work on the project from abroad. An actual contract valued at $10 million for machinery and equipment was signed in June 2001, initially for 18 months, but later extended. This cooperation continued right up until the war.

A different group of foreign experts traveled to Iraq in 1999 to conduct a technical review that resulted in what became the Al Samoud 2 design, and a contract was signed in 2001 for the provision of rigs, fixtures and control equipment for the redesigned missile.

Detainees and cooperative sources have described the role of a foreign expert in negotiations on the development of Iraq's liquid and solid propellant production infrastructure. This could have had applications in existing and planned longer range systems, although it is reported that nothing had actually been implemented before OIF.
Uncertainty remains about the full extent of foreign assistance to Iraq's planned expansion of its missile systems and work is continuing to gain a full resolution of this issue. However, there is little doubt from the evidence already gathered that there was substantial illegal procurement for all aspects of the missile programs.

I have covered a lot of ground today, much of it highly technical. Although we are resisting drawing conclusions in this first interim report, a number of things have become clearer already as a result of our investigation, among them:

Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.

In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced, but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened, would have resulted in the production of missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess of the UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program about which we have much still to learn.

In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and development activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.
Let me conclude by returning to something I began with today. We face a unique but challenging opportunity in our efforts to unravel the exact status of Iraq's WMD program. The good news is that we do not have to rely for the first time in over a decade on

the incomplete, and often false, data that Iraq supplied the UN/IAEA;

data collected by UN inspectors operating with the severe constraints that Iraqi security and deception actions imposed;

information supplied by defectors, some of whom certainly fabricated much that they supplied and perhaps were under the direct control of the IIS;

data collected by national technical collections systems with their own limitations.
The bad news is that we have to do this under conditions that ensure that our work will take time and impose serious physical dangers on those who are asked to carry it out.

Why should we take the time and run the risk to ensure that our conclusions reflect the truth to the maximum extent that is possible given the conditions in post-conflict Iraq? For those of us that are carrying out this search, there are two reasons that drive us to want to complete this effort.

First, whatever we find will probably differ from pre-war intelligence. Empirical reality on the ground is, and has always been, different from intelligence judgments that must be made under serious constraints of time, distance and information. It is, however, only by understanding precisely what those difference are that the quality of future intelligence and investment decisions concerning future intelligence systems can be improved. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is such a continuing threat to global society that learning those lessons has a high imperative.

Second, we have found people, technical information and illicit procurement networks that if allowed to flow to other countries and regions could accelerate global proliferation. Even in the area of actual weapons there is no doubt that Iraq had at one time chemical and biological weapons. Even if there were only a remote possibility that these pre-1991 weapons still exist, we have an obligation to American troops who are now there and the Iraqi population to ensure that none of these remain to be used against them in the ongoing insurgency activity.

Mr. Chairman and Members I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the initial results of the first 3 months of the activities of the Iraqi Survey Group. I am certain that I speak for Major General Keith Dayton, who commands the Iraqi Survey Group, when I say how proud we are of the men and women from across the Government and from our Coalition partners, Australia and the United Kingdom, who have gone to Iraq and are carrying out this important mission.

Thank you.

Ok I have said it once....

And I will say it again. TV is what is wrong with this nation.,1,5333417.story?coll=chi-news-hed

my favorite quote:

On the late-night talk shows, which surveys indicate are a primary source of political news for many young voters, comedians excoriated Dean. On "The Tonight Show," Jay Leno said: "I'm not an expert in politics, but I think it's a bad sign when your speech ends with your aides shooting you with a tranquilizer gun."


Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Ethnic fighting

The Kurds have a lesson to learn from the Jews, although the Kurds have their own experience with war. The Muslims at their heels will never go away, and their state (if they declare independence) will quickly become a security state meant to protect the people. Also, if they win any land in a war, don't expect the resident population to go anywhere and don't expect the countries to take back their refugees anytime soon.

But then again they could learn some lessons from Kosovo, if you are nice enough and are getting slaughtered. The UN might just step in and save you. Although, the Kurds don't meet the requirements to be a nation laid out in the earlier article, the could eventually give 20 or 30 years.


When are the Kurds getting there own country and who are they?

The Kurds are becoming a hot topic in the Middle East. I am wondering if I am the only one seeing the hypocrisy the Middle Eastern countries are showing.

Here is a little background on the Kruds.

While in other news Turkey, Syria, and Iran are getting along nicely.

In the above article destabilization and the integrity of Iraq's boarders were mentioned as reasons for the Kurds not to get their own ethnic state.

These countries don't care about territorial integrity of Iraq. They just don't want their boarders compromised at all. Although, they don't care about the boarders of other countries. Syrian and Iran both want Israel destroyed. Since these two countries are so caring and loving toward other countries it would seem logical they would want to protect boarders of Israel also.

Also, none of them have a consistent stance on ethnic groups.

If Turkey supports Israel that would mean they would have support the separate ethnic and governmental separation of Palestine and Israel.

Both Syria and Iran support the Palestine having their own ethnic state, although they want clean the place of all the Jewish trash first. Although, (big long collective Muslim sigh here) unfortunately the destruction of the of the Jews is a little out of their collective reach (it was in 1948 and it is now), so they are going to have to settle for the same thing that Turkey wants: Two ethnic states.

Does anyone else see the disconnect, they want the Irsreal-Palastine conflict to end in two separate states (since the option of destroying the Jews is out of play), but yet they want to keep this other ethnic minority from declaring independence at all costs.

Wait a minute….What do the Jews and the Kurds have in common besides monosyllabic ethic names. They are both non-Arabic. Snap. That is it.

The Kurds are a non-Arab Middle Eastern minority population.


Monday, January 19, 2004

An interesting piece by UPI

The battle for time off by the workers of America and a more efficient economy by the policy makers of America is picking up. The above article did not question the fact that America should get more time off. As a cog in the wheel of corporation I would appreciate more time off, but you would have to add up the total effect on the economy if America was given more time off. For every 364 workers that a company employed, they would have to hire another full time employee to make up the lost day.

Although that does not seem like much, it gets even more extreme when you talk about giving a mandatory three weeks off (which some are trying to push though). For every 52 workers you would have to hire an extra worker.

Let's take a look at the employment situation.

Australia considers full employment to be at around five percent.

America considers full employment to be between 5.2 and 4 percent. The article below seems to make a good bid for the 4 percent mark.

With unemployment sitting at 5.7 percent, and the current labor force sitting around 141 million.

what is the total amount of workers that we have in surplus? Take 141 million and multiply by .017, and you get 2,397,000. If you use the higher estimate of full employment you would take 141 million and multiply by .005 and you would get 705,000. Just as a side note if you were to add a new mandatory day off you would create 387,362 new jobs if the work force was 141 million. If you were to added a week off you would create 2,711,538, which is more than the surplus workers that we have.

I think I just solved the unemployment problem.

Of course the fact that the economy would be 1/364 th or 1/52 nd less efficient does not bother any one.


Sunday, January 18, 2004

In the market place of ideas these guys are seldom bought

Right now under the feature article there is some UFO footage.

Have fun, and remember that they are you daddy.


Saturday, January 17, 2004

Now it all makes sense

Check this one out, here is some interesting info from fox.,2933,108290,00.html

Friday, January 16, 2004

I can see you

Here is a very interesting article. My friend says it is proof that we were engineered by aliens.


Wednesday, January 14, 2004

How to Handle a Rouge Country

This above quote is from an article detailing Dean’s foreign policy. At the end of the article it talks about Clark. Clark says this:

Clark reiterated his campaign's themes: the need for a "new Atlantic Charter" to guide NATO and other allies as they face rogue states and nuclear threats; the idea of using the Cold War approach the United States and Europe used against the former Soviet Union as a blueprint for the Middle East; and the need for the United States to cooperate with other countries by rejoining efforts to create an International Criminal Court and joining the Kyoto agreement or its equivalent.

The part that I want to concentrate on is this.

the idea of using the Cold War approach the United States and Europe used against the former Soviet Union as a blueprint for the Middle East

I thought Clark was better than a one size fits all strategy for dealing with rouge countries. A simple strategy that does not take into account the complexities which have emerged after the fall of communism is doomed to fail.

The approach we took with the USSR was one of containment. From what I understand the Korean War and Vietnam were apart of this. The second part of the approach (which is as important as the first part) we engaged the USSR in an arms race they had no chance of winning because of the structure of their society. We basically out produced them.

I agree with Clark on the point of containing rouge states, they should not be allowed to spread their power. Gulf War 1 is a good example of stopping that kind of activity. This is basically a defensive approach, which will keep the status quo, but will not make the world a better place. We can contain the cancer all you want, but if you never remove the cancer, it still has the chance spreading.

The second phase of dealing with rouge states has to be drastically different than the second phase of dealing with the USSR, because of the amount of change that has happened in the world in the past 14 years.

With rouge states it does not matter if our economy is better than theirs, because theirs is most likely very bad anyways. Additionally, they are not competing with us on very many levels economically.

The fact that we can out produce a small, rouge, centrally planned county is obvious and does us no good.

Also, we can't just leave the rouge country alone, we have to engage it somehow, either economically, politically, or using the military. A policy of just containment is postponing the eventual chaos (Eventually the leader will die, and chaos will ensue. Just watch what happens in Cuba when Castro dies. I doubt it will be peaceful). The engagement principle is well noted, we did not just contain the USSR, we engaged them in a cold war and in an arms build up that they could not win.

You have to take each county and do an analysis of it, and decide a course of action tailored for that rouge state.
One rouge state may get international pressure, another economic sanctions, and another military action. There should be some general guidelines so that our policy makers have a playbook of what to do with a rouge country. The ones that pose the biggest threat should be treated differently than the ones that just causing the deaths of thousands of people though negligence. New and creative ideas should be tried on the ones that are a lesser threat, along with large amount of specific intelligence gathering on the ones that pose a greater threat.

In short:
Containing then ignoring, will only allow them to get a greater hold on their county and the region. You must contain and then engage the country (though as many avenues as possible).


Friday, January 09, 2004

Bush is not all bad

Well the numbers are in. Our kids are smarter than they were two years ago.

Although they on average are not that much smarter, you have to realize what it takes to move well grounded averages like testing scores.

But let’s make a list of what has happened while bush have been in office.

He fixed the economy.
(Note: there is no proof that one man can make a difference in the economy, but there is no proof against it. Also, it has been said that the tax cuts could have been done better, but no systems where proposed to take the place of the present system)

He made the education system better.
He started finger-printing people when they enter the country, and caught 21 felons in the first test run.
He tried to make Medicare better. (It will have to be seen if it helps)
He cut taxes and got me some more money.

Oh yea, he took over two countries, and caught the leader of one.
He put Al queda on the run.

He put the UN in their place, and the rest of the world.

He also showed that with great power comes great responsibility (buy doing the morally correct thing and taking over Iraq).

He got Iran and Libya to start behaving.
He called North Korea out on the rug for their actions, and got the rest of the world involved in dealing with them so it want be our problem any more. (Since they still can't hit most of America, it is not really our problem, but we are trying to help out everyone else.)

He has proposed a national immigration change that could be good, if we are then allowed to lock down the boarders of the US like never before.

Note: he also found a homeless man's radium stash.

And you know that a homeless man's radium can be deadly.

And yesterday I swear I saw Bush swoop down from the sky, and save children from a burning bus.


Tuesday, January 06, 2004


This is a good explanation of what happened.

My favorite part of the above article is:

On Wednesday, Brazil's foreign ministry formally requested Brazil be removed from the list of countries whose citizens must be photographed and fingerprinted upon entering the United States, or Brazil would deal with entering U.S. citizens the same way.

Let be get this straight. They are trying to tell us what to do.

Hmm....I think the UN tried that crap, also. Look how that turned out: we took over another country in two weeks, freed 25 million people, captured it's president (notice I am not being biased by calling Saddam the spawn of Satan or whatever Islam has for Satan),while giving our money, time, and our kids lives to do it.

Blow me Brazil, and I would like a side of Soy with that (their main export).

Some additional links:

a biased article, with some good points

In a pilot program at Hartsfield-Jackson that preceded Monday's nationwide implementation, authorities turned up 21 people on the FBI's criminal watch list for such crimes as drug offenses, rape and visa fraud, Ridge said.

Foreigners also will be checked as they leave the country as an extra security measure and to ensure they complied with visa limitations.

The pilot program caught 21 people. Can me institute this domestically? I think we should start this program in taxis and bus stations also. It is great.

One thing I would like to see is for all countries to be included on this. Only Miss. Universe contestants are allowed free and clear access to the united States of America, and the Universe contestants can stay as long as they like.

This will increase my chance of meeting and mating with one.


Saturday, January 03, 2004

told you

I called it, man i wish i would have made a bet with someone over this.


Friday, January 02, 2004

From Sandcastle

I also wanted you to know that I am accessing the internet thru 101st Airborne now, and their administration is different. I can't blog because that falls under the restricted category "chat rooms and message boards." However I can shop for Russian women at Have fun.